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Nick Hardy  
 
Abstract 
Over time Althusserian theory has come to define, Balibar (1994) 
argues, two distinct types of theoretical object: the first are large 
structural totalities (such as the capitalist mode of production), the 
second are conjunctures (specific concrete circumstances).  However, 
a problem is created by this separation because it forces the theorist 
to follow one or the other of two distinct lines of philosophical 
inquiry.  This begs the question as to whether this separation can be 
overcome; and, if so, how?  This paper develops the argument that 
Althusser’s concept of aleatory materialism can be used as a bridge 
between structural totalities and conjunctures.  An outline of aleatory 
materialism is first developed, before then being used to interrogate 
examples of both structural and conjunctural arguments.  Althusser’s 
(1982/2006) and Balibar’s (1968/2006) accounts of the failed Italian, 
but successful British, establishment of a capitalist mode of 
production are used to establish structural examples of aleatory 
change.  Following this is an analysis of Althusser’s assessment of 
Machiavelli and his development of the two concepts of conjuncture 
and dispositif.  The paper concludes by arguing aleatory materialism 
enables the conceptualisation of a non-reductionist materialism that 
holds: (a) social and natural ontology is sui generis; (b) structures are 
immanent and require constant renewal; (c) social theory/philosophy 
must abstractly break structures into their component parts; and (d) 
that the Althusserian formulation of politics as ‘struggle’ is key to 
producing social change.  
 
Keywords: Aleatory materialism, Althusser, Balibar, conjuncture, 
dispositif, dispositive, events, Machiavelli, mode of production, 
retroaction, structure.   
 
Introduction  
In Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists 
(1967/1990: 103), Louis Althusser briefly outlines what he 
understands a conjuncture to be.  It is not until his discussion in 
Machiavelli and Us (1976/1999) that he again covers the concept of 
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 conjunctures in any depth.  In Philosophy…, Althusser argues that 
philosophy exists alongside science as one of the two elements that 
constitute theory.  Theory always finds itself present as one element 
in a combination of three forces—political, ideological, and 
theoretical—which exist in a tension that Althusser terms a 
conjuncture.  For Althusser, philosophy holds a position of prime 
importance because it constitutes the site of intellectual struggle and 
is the necessary precursor to political (i.e. class) struggle.  Yet 
philosophy does not possess in itself any inherently ‘truthful’ 
knowledge about the particular conjuncture of which it is part:  
 
To limit ourselves to the essential, the domain of theory 
embraces the whole of science and the whole of philosophy.  
Philosophy itself is therefore part of the conjuncture in which it 
intervenes: it exists within this conjuncture, is exists within the 
‘Whole’ [i.e. the political, ideological, and theoretical].  It follows 
that philosophy cannot entertain an external, purely speculative 
relation, a relation of pure knowledge to the conjuncture, 
because it takes part in this ensemble (ibid.: 104).  
 
In other words, there is no ‘view from nowhere’ from which 
philosophy is able to situate itself, considering events with its 
dispassionate gaze.  For Althusser philosophy always “exists within 
[the] conjuncture,” i.e. it is always formed within, conditioned by, and 
mediated through the particular political, ideological, and theoretical 
forces that constitute its historical circumstance.  Conjunctures, 
therefore, place significant constraints upon both the concrete and 
the abstract possibilities contained within them.   
Despite this, philosophy remains the only means for generating 
non-ideological inquiries into concrete circumstances.  As Balibar 
argues, theory (the aforementioned combination of philosophy and 
science) not only “…break[s] with the dominant ideology, but also 
act[s] upon ideology…” (1994: 176).  Theory, therefore, is understood 
to be not only a non-ideological argument set against a prevalent 
ideology (such as Marx accomplished in his critique of political 
economy), but is also a means of destabilising that ideology.1  Theory 
is not an ‘alternative’ system of thought, it is a form of attack.  But is 
ideology the only object open to attack?  It would seem not.  
                                            
1
 There appears a prima facie similarity here to Foucault’s “polyvalence of discourses” 
(1976/1990: 100).  
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 Althusserian theory came to define, Balibar argues, two distinct types 
of theoretical object: the first are large structural totalities (such as 
the capitalist mode of production), the second are conjunctures 
(specific concrete circumstances) (Balibar 1994: 166).  The problem 
lies in that Althusser—and a large number of those following him—
maintained this theoretical separation between totalities and 
conjunctures (ibid.).  This begs the question, then, as to whether this 
separation can be overcome; and, if so, how?  
This article contends that one of the last theoretical projects 
begun by Althusser—viz. aleatory materialism—represents a major 
breakthrough for both Althusser’s thought specifically and materialist 
thought more generally.  The significance of aleatory materialism is 
that it enables a non-deterministic concept of historical and social 
change.  Unfinished by Althusser at the time of his death and 
published posthumously, aleatory materialism begins as an ill-
defined concept that requires substantial theoretical development.  
However, while this forms an impediment to its immediate 
application and use, the conceptual underdevelopment of aleatory 
materialism also opens up possibilities for it to be expanded as a 
means of explaining both structural totalities and concrete 
conjunctures.   
In Althusser’s formulation of structural totalities, he extends 
Marx’s rejection of Hegel’s concept of society as being a “single 
totality” (1965/2005: 102), replete with its morphing and unfolding 
as it teleologically rediscovers knowledge about itself.  Instead, 
Althusser conceives of society being a “complex whole” of various 
structures that interlink and interrelate, or a “structure in 
domination” (ibid.).  When articulated as a whole, therefore, these 
structures act upon each other giving a particular form and shape to a 
society.  For example, a feudal set of productive relations creates a 
very different form of society (to families, to education, to commerce, 
to government, etc.) than industrial capital productive relations.   
Within a society, each of these structures is separate and distinct 
from the other; indeed, for Althusser, many structures maintain 
antagonistic relations vis-à-vis one another.  Some of the most severe 
of these antagonisms are inherent in structured relations at their 
moment of genesis (e.g. in capitalism this antagonism is between 
capital and labour).  Where these severe antagonisms occur, 
Althusser terms them ‘contradictions’ (1965/2005).  It is the 
instability contained in these contradictions that leads to the 
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 strongest possibilities for social transformation.  It is also the 
unpredictability of these antagonisms that make them aleatory.  
Alternatively, aleatory materialism can also be used to explain 
specific conditions, i.e. localised conjunctures.  By investigating how 
social structures and relations of force (such as the political, 
ideological, and theoretical forces outlined earlier) form, crystallise, 
and then endure, aleatory materialism enables the possibility to 
theorise how conjunctures (dis)allow other structures to form around 
them.  This includes analysing how particular social relations may 
come to be a dominant form, exerting a ‘freezing’ influence over 
possible change.  In an argument very similar to the one concerning 
larger social structures, it is only through the destabilisation of 
crystallised relations that social change occurs.  The problem with 
these two accounts is that each would appear to cause the other: 
larger structures produce smaller conjunctions, or smaller 
conjunctions produce larger structures.  Worse still, it would appear 
that human subjects do nothing more than exist in an eternal waiting 
room, hoping for a structural antagonism to destabilise relations and 
society to change.   
The argument in this article begins with an outline of Althusser's 
argument for aleatory materialism.  This conceptual overview is then 
used to re-examine Althusser’s and Balibar’s (1968/2006) highly 
detailed account of the historical changes that occurred in the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism.  Included alongside this is a 
discussion of Althusser’s (1976/1999) analysis of the work of Niccolò 
Machiavelli—especially Machiavelli’s use of what Althusser terms a 
‘dispositive’.  The article concludes by bringing together these 
different strands of aleatory materialism and developing an argument 
for how it might be used as a theoretical resource for critiquing social 
relations at the meta- and micro-levels.  
 
What is Aleatory Materialism? 
Althusser’s argument for aleatory materialism was posthumously 
published in a work titled The Underground Current of the 
Materialism of the Encounter (1982/2006: hereafter UCME).  In it, 
Althusser rejects historical and philosophical accounts that view 
history as containing either a supra-historical transcendental subject 
(be it God or ‘Man’) or a telos that underpins/directs the movements 
of history toward a pre-determined End.  History occurs instead, 
Althusser argues, as chance encounters between different elements 
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 that may, sometimes, ‘take hold’ and create new natural and social 
structures.   
Althusser begins his argument for aleatory materialism by going 
back to the Ancient Greeks, specifically Epicurus’ notion of atoms 
falling in a void (UCME: 168).  Epicurus argued that it takes only one 
‘swerve’—which Althusser terms a ‘clinamen’—for one atom to hit 
another and it is from this chance encounter between the two atoms, 
the ‘deviation from a straight trajectory’, that creates a series of 
subsequent random encounters that begin to form basic natural 
structures.  Using an analogy of the formation of ice, Althusser argues 
that elements are continually moving and coming into contact with 
one another, but they only form into something new when they ‘take 
hold’, crystallising (which Althusser terms ‘prise’) into a new 
structure (UCME: 170, 191-2).  And, importantly, it is only after 
crystallising that the new structures begin to produce effects (a point 
that will be returned to below).  Furthermore, it is the semi-
permanence of these structures that produces the sense of ‘continuity’ 
being ‘natural’ and ‘normal’.   
This seemingly innocuous position allows Althusser to argue that 
the world is, ultimately, nothing more than the product of these 
‘chance encounters’.  There is no guiding thread, no force that creates 
the world, there is “no Meaning, neither Cause nor End nor Reason 
nor Unreason.  The non-anteriority of Meaning is one of Epicurus’ 
basic theses, by virtue of which he stands opposed to both Plato and 
Aristotle” (UCME : 169).  Emphasising this position is important 
because it firmly establishes the link between knowledge and the 
world ‘as it is’.2  Althusser argues that although the world-as-it-exists 
is an “accomplished fact,” which may now apparently contain Reason, 
Meaning, Necessity and End (ibid.), the world was still formed 
though a process of chance encounters.  If those chance encounters 
were to reoccur, most likely the world not form again the same way 
that it currently is—it would be very different and would therefore 
contain significantly different knowledge(s) that developed in regard 
to it.  By specifying this linkage, Althusser highlights that knowledge 
is created from within the boundaries of the established world and is 
not gained from any external, enduring source.  Therefore, what may 
                                            
2
 It is important to note that Althusser is not making an ontic fallacy, whereby whatever an object 
‘is’ then forms the knowledge held about it.  If this were the case then knowledge would change in 
direct correlation to the changing form of the object.  Althusser is instead arguing that knowledge 
is produced from within a particular set of structures.  
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 appear to be enduring structures and ‘truths’ are just that, 
appearances.  Knowledge is always linked to the chance encounters 
that structure the present external world.  
To give another example, Althusser likens the aleatory 
materialist philosophy to “catching a moving train” (UCME : 189).  
The analogy illustrates how inquiries into the structure of the world 
(in this instance, the inquiring aleatory materialist philosopher) can 
only generate knowledge relative to short periods.  By analysing the 
world the philosopher (may) come to understand only a few of the 
multiple events that are taking place and, even then, cannot know 
precisely what preceded them it or what lies ahead of them (ibid.).  
With the rejection of the idea that there is one particular beginning 
(Origin) that the world is moving from—or one particular route 
(telos) to take or destination (End) at which to arrive—the world is 
instead a product of multiple encounters and events that continue to 
occur regardless of almost all other things.  The world is comprised of 
structures and objects that are continually under pressure, forming 
and reforming over time.  This is the aleatory materialist warning 
against a tendency prevalent within theory—and one which must be 
resisted—to ‘fill in the gaps’ between events.  As Pearce (2001: 40; 
n.b. Althusser 1987/2006: 263) argues, it becomes quite easy for the 
unaware investigator to ascribe ‘causality’ to unrelated but adjacent 
secondary factors, thereby missing the actual chain of causation (see 
Althusser 1966/2012: 2-3).   
However, the aleatory materialist position should not be 
understood to reduce all explanatory inquiry to meaningless random 
encounters.  Even if the idea of a ‘guiding force’ (in the form of a 
telos) has been firmly rejected, analysis can still be made of the 
immanent forces that are produced from the structures that 
constitute present relations.3  Althusser argues that there is a four 
stage process to the formation of aleatory structures.  First, and 
borrowing from Wittgenstein as well as Epicurus, Althusser argues 
that there must have been a period of ‘the Fall’ (UCME : 190).  Prior 
to structures forming, there is an initial moment/period of flux and 
uncertainty, where no relations and elements have yet attained a 
definition.  Second, ‘the encounter’ occurred where elements initially 
                                            
3
 This is not to imply that epistemic privilege is possible merely because the inquirer is situated 
within a particular set of relations.  Rather, it is that crystallised structures do produce effects and 
some of them can be determined through measured and rational inquiry.  This point will be 
developed below in Althusser’s discussion of the capitalist mode of production.  
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 came into contact with one another (Althusser’s ‘clinamen’).  This is 
the initial ‘aleatory’ formation of structures.   
Where structures are formed, constituting the third event, 
Althusser terms this the ‘taking hold’ (or the ‘prise’) (UCME : 191).  
These structures begin to amass and constitute increasing numbers of 
natural and social relations.  Once structures form they then act as 
‘hooks’ for other similar elements which become ‘entangled’ 
(Althusser uses water becoming slowly bonded to existing formations 
of ice as an example).  
 
What one must call an affinity and a complementarity 
[complétude] of the elements that come into play in the 
encounter; their ‘readiness to collide—interlock’ [accrohabilité], 
in order that this encounter ‘take hold’, that is to say, ‘take form’, 
at last give birth to Forms, and new Forms—just as water ‘takes 
hold’ when ice is waiting there for it, or milk does when it 
curdles… (UCME : 191-2, emphasis in original) 
 
Fourth and finally, the primacy of Being becomes paramount.  The 
atoms/elements constitute “assignable, distinct, localisable beings 
endowed with such-and-such a property (depending on the time and 
place); in short there emerges in them a structure of Being… that 
assigns each of its elements its place…” (UCME: 192).  For aleatory 
materialism, it is the existence of structures that produces further 
structures in the world at all—and if those structures were different, 
then the world would be different as well.  In other words, if the 
atoms/elements were arranged in a different configuration, then the 
structures would be different, meaning their operation would be 
different, including any associated knowledge of them.  The 
importance of this is that there is no background order ‘behind’ the 
structures themselves, there is no universal blueprint or set of 
specifications that all objects are designed to ‘fit’.  This is why the 
contingency of these structures becomes such an important 
philosophical position: if they change, then the world also changes.  
This “puts discourse on the world for ever in second place” (ibid., 
emphasis in original).  This means that, for aleatory materialism, the 
real world is separate from discursive understanding of it: the 
material world pre-exists discourse.  
Three implications follow for any investigation using aleatory 
materialism.  The first is that any thing or object that exists must have 
7
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 been formed through these wider aleatory processes—nothing ‘pre-
exists’ its own existence, biding its time, ‘waiting’ to come into being.  
Everything that has Being must have already gone through the 
process of an ‘encounter’ in order to come into Being (ibid.).  Second, 
there are encounters or entities that are only produced as the result of 
multiple causes and effects, which Althusser terms a ‘series’.  Not 
everything forms from one ‘simple’ encounter, rather there are some 
structures that can only arise out of a series of consecutive 
encounters: the formation of one yielded a particular result that 
allowed the next to form, etc., etc. (UCME: 193, 277-8).  Finally, every 
encounter is aleatory, both in cause and effect.  For Althusser, effects 
are conditioned by the aleatory circumstances just as the causes 
leading up to an encounter are also aleatory (ibid.). 
Indeed, it is in discussing this last point that Althusser argues for 
the dual principles of necessity and contingency to be understood as 
key in the development of structures.  Necessity because without 
certain elements an encounter could not have crystallised; 
contingency because chance is the prime element in bringing all of 
the elements together in one place at one time.  If a philosopher 
wishes to analyse the development of a thing, then a process of 
retroaction must be employed.  By working backwards from an 
established structure/object, is it possible to isolate and identify the 
particular events and encounters that must have taken place during 
its process of ‘becoming’ that eventually brought that structure/object 
into Being (UCME: 193-4).  It is here that the necessity of 
circumstance is so important in the production of a structure/object.   
Althusser argues that it is this process that gives the world 
meaning:  
 
This shows that we are not—that we do not live—in Nothingness 
[le Néant], but that, although there is no Meaning to [NH] 
history (an End which transcends it, from its origins to its term), 
there can be meaning in history, since this meaning emerges 
from an encounter that was real, and really felicitous—or 
catastrophe, which is also a meaning (UCME : 194, [NH] 
emphasis added).  
 
However, Althusser takes care not to imply that, once the world 
(which is the sum of what ‘already exists’) has established a set of 
structures, these structures then give permanent and definite sets of 
8
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 ‘laws’ (ibid.).  While there certainly are effects that are generated by 
things/structures, there is no certainty to the endurance of either the 
thing/structure or its effects.  The continuity of structures can be 
quickly broken.  It is a mistake to understand structures as all 
following a trajectory that sees their effects manifest, maintain 
themselves, and then fade away (e.g. a comparison to birth, life, and 
death).  Instead, Althusser argues, laws can change “at the drop of a 
hat, revealing the aleatory basis that sustains them, and can change 
without reason, this is, without an intelligible end” (UCME: 195-6, 
emphasis added).   
He likens these moments of “radical instability” (UCME: 195) to 
the dice in a game “thrown back on to the table unexpectedly, or the 
cards are dealt out again without warning” (ibid.: 196).  He makes a 
link to the madness of Friedrich Nietzsche and Antonin Artaud as two 
examples of moments that redefined the very structure of their 
thought: their constitution as individuals was shattered and then 
brought back together again—albeit in a different, post-madness, 
form.  He also alludes to the huge social changes resulting from the 
French Revolution and the Russian Revolution of 1917 (UCME: 196).  
During these instances, established social structures were broken 
apart into a mixture of separate elements with some smaller/partial 
structures ‘breaking free’; 4  it was the recombination of these 
components that subsequently formed into the structures/objects 
that came to form revolutionary France and Russia.   
As it presently stands, the discussion has been highly abstract.  
However, by examining the analysis offered in Reading Capital 
(Althusser & Balibar 1968/2006; hereafter RC) of the change from 
feudalism to capitalism, a more concrete account of aleatory 
materialism can be produced.  It is to this issue that the argument 
now turns.   
 
Aleatory Materialism in Structures and Conjunctures  
Althusser concludes his discussion in UCME with an analysis of the 
aleatory nature of the change from feudalism to capitalism.  
Ultimately, it was the chance encounter, he argues, between the 
“owners of money” and “the proletarian, stripped of everything but 
labour-power” (UCME: 197).  It was this circumstance that enabled 
                                            
4
 Althusser called these ‘survivals’, borrowing the phrase from Lenin (Althusser, 1965/2005: 114). 
9
Hardy: Theory From the Conjuncture
Published by OxyScholar, 2014
 wage-labour relations to come into existence.5  However, the fact that 
this encounter ‘took hold’ [prise] and formed new social relations was 
not a pre-gone conclusion; neither were the other encounter that led 
to this circumstance ‘destined’ to produce it.  It is quite possible, he 
argues, that these other preceding relations were present in other 
times and places but yet a prise moment never occurred.   
Citing 1500s Italy as an example, Althusser argues that there 
were nearly all the elements found in a capitalist mode of production 
(i.e. wealth and technology, their concentration in the hands of a 
small elite, and a large and landless workforce).  Importantly, 
however, there was no ‘Italy’ to speak of at the time, there were only 
warring ‘statelets’.  The consequences of this were that there was little 
or no assurance or security (in a Hobbesian sense), and that there was 
no market of ‘Italian’ consumers large enough to support the 
development of large-scale production (UCME: 198).  However, jump 
forward in time to England just before the Industrial Revolution, and 
all the necessary elements are together in one place at the same 
time—and which culminated, ultimately, in the first establishment of 
industrial capitalism. 
By developing an analysis like this Althusser enables a valuable 
comparison to be made to his earlier work, with Etienne Balibar in 
RC, and his later argument in UCME.  In RC, Balibar’s extended 
analysis of the change from the feudal mode of production (FMP) to 
the capitalist mode of production (CMP) provides an intriguing and 
valuable comparison between Althusser’s argument for a failed prise 
(Italy) and a successful prise (England).  
 
The founding structures of industrial capitalism  
Developing a detailed argument tracking the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism, Balibar (1968/2006: 199-308) placed special 
emphasis upon the existing social relations from which capitalism 
first emerged.  He argues that social structures and social relations 
had immanent effects—i.e. existing relations continually exerted 
pressure(s) upon the relations that eventually formed in to the new 
mode of production (MoP).  (This is a development of Marx’s 
comment that a MoP does not change without its future constituent 
parts already being present (1859/1983).)  Althusser echoes Balibar in 
his later argument that an ‘accomplished fact’ cannot be used to 
                                            
5
 “Wage-labour” has significance because it is unique to the capitalist mode of production, a point 
that will be elaborated below.  
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 explain its own process of “becoming-accomplished” (UCME: 199-
200)—i.e. an effect or outcome cannot be its own cause (for if it did 
not previously exist, then it could not have been present to ‘cause’ 
itself).  The capitalist mode of production (CMP) was neither an 
historical inevitability6 nor was it ‘waiting’ in the wings to ‘happen’.  
Balibar argues that when investigating a MoP, a theorist must be 
conscious that:  
 
…the analysis of the productive forces does not arise as a 
technical or geographical preliminary, formulating the 
conditions or bases on which a ‘social’ structure of human 
institutions and practices can be constructed, as an essential, but 
external limitation imposed on history: on the contrary, it is 
inside the definition of the social structure of a mode of 
production (no definition of a ‘mode of production’ can be 
regarded as satisfactory unless it includes a definition of the 
productive forces of that mode of production); it therefore 
completely transforms the meaning of ‘social’ (RC: 247, emphasis 
in original).  
 
In other words, the forces and structures that ‘constitute(d)’ a MoP 
are found within that MoP itself.  It becomes the task of theoretical 
inquiry—backed by empirical accounts—to explain the circumstances 
that enabled the development of the particular social relations that 
then formed into a particular MoP.  It is a question of identifying the 
factors that enabled the transition from one MoP to another, and not 
to make the mistake (as even Marx did at times, Althusser argues 
(UCME: 202)) of taking the accomplished fact as being its own cause.  
Within Marx’s own accounts, Althusser identifies two 
contradictory explanations for the emergence of the MoP (UCME: 
197).  The first explanation (and the one in which Althusser finds 
value) is found in Engels’ Condition of the Working-Class in 
England, in Capital’s chapter on ‘primitive accumulation’, and in the 
theory of the Asiatic MoP.  The second (and less sophisticated 
account) is found in Capital’s discussion of the “essences” of 
capitalism, the two accounts of the FMP and the CMP, and also in 
Marx’s theories of the transition from FMP to CMP.  For Althusser, 
                                            
6
 To argue this is a crude reductionism and a position that Althusser’s and Balibar’s accounts are 
at pains to avoid; at best, this argument is nothing more than a materialist reworking of Hegel’s 
teleological account of ‘History’. 
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 the first account offers a precise and detailed explanation of the 
complex social reformations and interactions that led to the 
development of the CMP.  
 
I am repeating myself, but I must: what is remarkable about the 
first conception [of the CMP], apart from the explicit theory of 
the encounter, is the idea that every mode of production 
comprises elements that are independent of each other, each 
resulting from its own specific history, in the absence of any 
organic, teleological relation between these diverse histories.  
This conception culminates in the theory of primitive 
accumulation… (UCME: 199, emphasis in original).  
 
Althusser’s aleatory analysis of the transition from FMP to CMP 
begins with his argument that the dominant feudal class in England 
were able to absorb the new landless and property-less labourers into 
a new form of generalised production.  This was achieved through 
clustering individual means of production in large workshops, 
something that the Italian proto-bourgeoisie, described in Althusser’s 
account above, were unable to do.  Althusser’s argument is that this 
chance encounter first established the set of relations that later 
formed into the much more rigid social relations of the CMP.  The 
combination of new technology, a concentration of wealth, a workless 
labour force, and very large (although at that time still only 
‘potential’) national and colonial markets, was enough for Britain to 
first form an industrial CMP in the late-1700s.   
Balibar’s analysis gives flesh to the skeletal account offered by 
Althusser.  Balibar argues the transition from the FMP into the CMP 
can be understood through the “genealogy” of primitive accumulation 
(RC: 279, 281; see also Althusser 1966/2012: 1-2).  Through charting 
the drastic changes in how different elements are related to one 
another, the transition starts to become clear.  Balibar begins by 
turning his focus toward the growing fragmentation of the 
(re)productive capacities of the FMP, where adverse tension was 
created in two ways.  The first was that the link between serfs and 
agriculture was broken by the land enclosure acts—most likely for 
landowners to farm increasing numbers of sheep for their valuable 
wool; the second was when the small, but still significant, class of 
individual petty-commodity producers started to come under the 
control of the proto-bourgeoisie—a situation that Balibar will later 
12
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 term ‘formal subsumption’ (UCME: 199; RC: 280; Marx 1867/1990: 
874-875).   
For Balibar, it is both the reformation of existing elements (the 
same things changing) and the alteration of the structural relations 
which the elements have to each other in a particular way that 
constitutes the transition from FMP to CMP.  The final sealing 
together of these events, he argues, came from the development of the 
“machine-tool.”  Despite an already existing complex division of 
labour between workers, it was this (aleatory) element that proved 
decisive (RC: 239).  Suddenly, the worker was removed from 
undertaking any form of (semi-)skilled labour and was, instead, only 
required to watch over the productive capacity of the machine itself.   
 
The machine-tool makes the organisation of production 
completely independent of the characteristics of human labour-
power: at the same stroke, the means of labour and the labourer 
are completely separated and acquire different forms of 
development.  The previous relationship is inverted: rather than 
the instruments having to be adapted to the human organism, 
that [human] organism must adapt itself to the instrument 
(ibid., emphasis added).  
 
In sum, the concentration of the artisan/petty-commodity producers 
into mass workshops, the ejection of serfs/peasants from ancestral 
farmland, the amassing (i.e. “primitive accumulation”) of money into 
the ownership of a small class, and then, finally, the ability to 
industrially mass produce goods, were factors that all together 
enabled the initial construction of the CMP.  
 
The capitalist mode of production as a crystallised structure  
An important aspect of Balibar’s account is that he offers a convincing 
explanation for why the CMP was able to (in Althusser’s aleatory 
materialism term) ‘take hold’, to prise.  The crucial factor here is the 
proto-proletarian class moved from ‘formal’ to ‘real’ subsumption.  
The important change, Balibar argues, comes when relations alter 
from the initial employment of labourers by the capitalist to the first 
time those relations were reproduced but also incorporated the 
deployment of the machine-tool (RC: 303).   
The ‘formal’ subsumption of labourers occurred with their 
employment in factories after the capitalist had bought control over 
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 the (still individualised, still crafts based) means of production.7  At 
this stage, labourers could still (even if only potentially) re-establish 
themselves as commodity producers if they had the funds to purchase 
their own means of production (RC: 303-4).  For Balibar, this is one 
of the key points in the transition from FMP to CMP: although 
ownership is already becoming concentrated in the hands of one 
small group, there is still the possibility that the labourers could 
support themselves as individual producers.   
The moment of ‘real’ subsumption occurred with the 
introduction of the machine-tool.  The worker is suddenly created as a 
class and systemically bound to their social position in two distinct 
ways: (1) they have been removed from ownership of the means of 
production (as was the case in ‘formal’ subsumption); but now also 
they are (2) unable to return to craft-manufacturing.  They are unable 
to return because the new machine-tool based manufacturing 
produces commodities at such extreme volume that the small hand-
craft manufacturer is unable to compete (RC: 303).  
Importantly, it is only when these new social relations first 
successfully reproduce themselves that Balibar argues the CMP 
becomes established.  During formal subsumption a full CMP had not 
formed (for it was still crafts based petty-commodity production, not 
industrial) and there was always the possibility of labourers returning 
to their own means of production.  With the technological shift that 
brought industrial, rather than crafts-based, production, this 
developed an initial (and largely unacknowledged) change in social 
relations that destroyed the possibility of crafts manufacturers 
owning their own means of production.  When the first cycle of 
capital was complete (i.e. surplus-value was extracted from the new 
wage-labour relation between proletariat and bourgeoisie) and used 
to re-establish the owner/wage labourer relationship (through further 
capital investment), it was at this moment that the CMP became 
established as a full MoP (RC: 262-3).  
Working Althusser’s aleatory materialist account into Balibar’s, 
this moment—when the first cycle of extracted surplus value was 
reinvested back into machine-tool production—was when the prise 
occurred, crystallising the new social relations into an enduring form.  
The crystallised social relations that ‘constitute’ the CMP, for Balibar, 
include not just new productive competition (machine tool vs. craft 
based), but also a new relation regarding the ‘individuality’ of 
                                            
7
 That is, craft-workshops containing, for instance, multiple individually operated spinning-wheels.   
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 labourers.  Previously, ‘to labour’ meant to individually possess 
certain skills and abilities (either trained, such as being a carpenters 
apprentice, or gained from experience, such as using a scythe to reap 
a field of barley).  But with the advent of machine-tools the labourer 
became instead a homogenised and generalised worker, needed only 
to service and aid the machine itself.  It was the machine that became 
the producer—no longer did workers employ machines to aid 
themselves in the act of production (RC: 252).  This altered social 
structure actively reconstituted elements within it (in this case the 
‘workers’ as elements) precisely because their relations to other 
elements had changed.   
Of course, the workers themselves had not physically changed, 
ontologically they were exactly the same, but their constitution as 
part of a wider social structure suddenly changed their capacities and 
powers.  This recasting of individuals signals a moment of rupture, a 
move from “production as an act, the objectivation of one or more 
[individual] subjects, to a concept of production without a subject, 
which determines certain classes as its peculiar functions” (RC: 268).  
For Balibar, an entire class is suddenly constituted and then cyclically 
reproduced through social relations.  These social relations structure 
their possible actions, trapping the labourers in a new class relation 
and a new set of social forces. 
It is these structural changes that both Balibar and Althusser 
argue produce the ‘histories’ and meanings that are specific, 
discontinuous, and localised.  For Balibar, each structural change 
creates new social relations—and contained within these 
combinations a specific history is developed.   
 
We can… say that each of the elements of the combination 
undoubtedly has a kind of ‘history’, but it is a history without 
any locatable subject: the real subject of each component history 
is the combination on which depend the elements and their 
relations, i.e. it is something which is not a subject (RC: 250, 
emphasis in original). 
 
Balibar continues:  
 
What Marx is reflecting here is quite simply the operation I was 
trying to explain at the beginning… to reduce the continuity of 
history, on which is based the impossibility of sharp ‘breaks’, and 
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 to constitute history as a science of discontinuous modes of 
production, as the science of variation (RC: 257; n.b. Pearce 
2001: 40).  
 
In Balibar’s work it is important to note that he understands each 
combination of elements (and the resulting social relations) as 
reconstituting the elements contained with it.  As there is never a 
period when social relations are not present—even, as has just been 
examined, during times of social transition and change—all objects 
and subjects (the two “elements”) are constantly part of a wider social 
structure that acts to ‘place’ them vis-à-vis other elements within that 
structure.  In short, there is no “hiatus” in social relations during 
times of change (RC: 273).  It is this inclusion within a wider 
structure and ordering that imbues elements with a number of their 
properties.8  
Althusser’s later aleatory materialist position is similar to 
Balibar’s.  As stated above, Althusser argued that there is no meaning 
to history (no telos, no End, etc.), yet there can be meaning in history 
(UCME : 194).  When the elements of social relations (in Balibar’s 
sense) re-form through a series of chance encounters into something 
new, they produce their own different history.  As Althusser states, 
“[a] mode of production is a combination because it is a structure 
that imposes its unity on a series of elements” (UCME : 203).  As such 
a unity the various elements within a particular set of social relations 
gain or lose particular properties, powers, and abilities.  Part of this is 
the development of a ‘history’ that is specific to that set of relations—
hence it is not possible to accurately trace ‘meanings’ back across time 
different time periods. Thus one cannot ever speak of ‘the working 
class’ outside of capitalist industrial relations: in feudalism there was 
no ‘working class’—the peasants were geographically distributed 
differently, they did not have a ‘common cause’ in the way the 
industrial working class might now be argued to have, etc.  To cast 
present categories back across time/social formations is to engage in 
an act that Marx, Althusser, Balibar, and Foucault (Foucault 
                                            
8
 Understood in the wrong way, this would appear to be an argument that objects gain their 
properties solely from their relations.  This is not being argued here: what is being argued is that 
the properties of things can include both circumstantial and inherent properties.  In this way, 
‘social properties’ are either constructed and assigned through structural relations (e.g. patriarchy 
or racism) or are already existing but mediated through structural relations (e.g. differences in life 
expectancy based on social class).  
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 1975/1995: 31) have all warned against: reading the past in terms of 
the present.   
The discussion so far has compared aspects of Althusser’s 
analysis of 1500s Italy to Balibar’s account of the emergence of the 
CMP.  Importantly, aleatory materialism was used as a means of 
explaining both.  What this comparison showed was that aleatory 
materialism can be adequately used to explain the (non-)development 
of social structures, up to and including a mode of production.  This is 
an explicit rejection of explaining changes to a MoP in any (semi-
)teleological manner (e.g. the crude idea that ‘one MoP must lead to 
the other’); under an aleatory materialist framework the change in a 
MoP is the result of chance encounters (e.g. ‘originally one MoP 
happened to lead to the other’).  Even more importantly, Althusser’s 
analysis shows that the complexity of the process of structural change 
can be brought under theoretical analysis.  Not only this, but change 
can be explained without recourse to supra-historical entities (be it a 
telos or ‘the subject’).  The immanence contained in Althusser’s and 
Balibar’s arguments mean that social structures are powerful—but 
they are also fragile: if they lose core relations within them (such as 
the capital/labour relation) then structural change may well be a 
result.  
 
Theorising Machiavelli’s political conjunctures  
So far the emphasis of this paper has been upon analysing social 
structures; examples being Althusser’s and Balibar’s accounts 
regarding social relations at the level of MoP.  However, these 
drastically change in Althusser analyses of the work of Niccolò 
Machiavelli (1469-1527).  In Machiavelli and Us (MU), Althusser 
develops an extended examination of two of Machiavelli’s works: The 
Discourses on Livy and The Prince.  For Althusser, Machiavelli’s 
arguments concerning ongoing Italian political (in)stability contained 
a focused and highly tactful analysis of the relations of forces that 
impeded good and stable government in Italy.  Machiavelli's 
intellectual achievement, Althusser argues, was to accomplish this 
from within the conjuncture of forces that were destabilising Italy.  
As will be discussed below, Machiavelli produces a largely aleatory 
analysis of the political conditions facing Italy—and which gave 
Althusser an opportunity to expand his own aleatory materialist 
account.  In MU Gregory Elliott, the translator, quotes Althusser as 
saying: “[Machiavelli] is, without doubt, much more so than Marx, 
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 the author who has most fascinated me” (Elliott 1999: xii).  In MU 
Elliott also refers to a comment made by Althusser (in the then 
untranslated and unpublished UCME), where Althusser argues that 
Machiavelli held:  
 
A materialist tradition almost completely unrecognised in the 
history of philosophy. …a materialism of the encounter, hence of 
the aleatory and of contingency, which is completely opposed… 
to the various registered materialisms, including the materialism 
commonly attributed to Marx, Engels, and Lenin, which, like 
every other materialism in the rationalist tradition, is a 
materialism of necessity and teleology, that is to say, a 
transformed and disguised form of idealism” (MU: xii-xiii; 
UCME: 167-8, emphasis added).  
 
It is this inherent focus upon materialism that marks Machiavelli’s 
work as distinct from other thinkers.  The crucial development that 
Machiavelli makes is to enable a theorist to “think in the 
conjuncture.”  This means  
 
…[T]aking account of all the determinations, all the existing 
concrete circumstances, making an inventory, a detailed 
breakdown and comparison of them. …  This inventory of 
elements and circumstances, however, is insufficient.  To think in 
terms of the category of conjuncture is not to think on the 
conjuncture, as one would reflect on a set of concrete data.  To 
think under the conjuncture is quite literally to submit to the 
problem induced and imposed by its case:… (MU: 18, emphasis 
in original).9  
 
It is not, therefore, a matter of simply developing a concrete account 
that analyses the conjuncture itself as a ‘thing that is meant to be’ 
(e.g. that would be akin to analysing a jammed mechanism and trying 
to understand it as a jammed mechanism).  Instead, a conjuncture 
must be analysed as nothing more than a series of forces/relations 
that, together and in this particular form, produce a particular 
                                            
9
 It may be helpful to continue the quote: “…the political problem of national unity and the 
constitution of Italy into a national state.  Here the terms must be inverted: Machiavelli does not 
think the problem of national unity in terms of the conjuncture; it is the conjuncture itself that 
negatively, yet objectively, poses the problem of Italian national unity” (ibid., emphasis added).  
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 circumstance (e.g. moving the analysis to investigate what the 
mechanism consists of and that it might do something other than be 
jammed).  Machiavelli, and by extension Althusser, is not concerned 
with the conjuncture qua conjuncture, but is instead concerned with 
understanding how the conjuncture ‘came to be’ and what might 
destabilise it.  It is worth stating that the concept of conjuncture need 
not imply adverse qualities.  All stable social relations are, on this 
understanding, some form of conjuncture—whether those relations 
are deemed to be admirable or deplorable rests with the particular 
effects experienced (or not) by those within the conjuncture.   
It is also important to recall that conjunctures—‘crystallised 
encounters’ Althusser later termed them (UCME: 170)—also produce 
‘truths’ that are constant for as long as the conjuncture endures.  The 
“relations of force” (MU: 19) that produce the conjuncture also give 
rise to particular effects that act in the same way as ‘laws’.  By 
maintaining different elements (which themselves each have different 
strengths, powers, and effects) in a particular relationship and form, 
the conjuncture partially (over)determines the outcomes possible 
from it (on ‘overdetermination’ see: Althusser 1967/1990: 221-223, 
1965/2005: 106,111-113; Balibar 1996: 115)).10  As has already been 
argued, in this light the productive relations found in the CMP, for 
instance, overdetermine elements of the social structures that form 
around it.  
Alongside defining the form of an existing conjuncture (i.e. the 
particular relation of forces of which it consists), Althusser also 
devoted considerable time to examining the circumstances leading to 
the formation of a particular conjunction.  Machiavelli’s analysis is 
again important because he attempted to define the factors that 
produced change in an existing conjunction.  In The Prince 
Machiavelli outlines the two absolutely essential attributes that a 
Prince must be able to marshal (Datta 2007): fortuna 
(external/objective) and virtù (internal/subjective).  Fortuna 
corresponds closely to chance events, general good fortune, and to 
‘circumstance’ (MU: 35, 74).  For a Prince to stamp their mark on the 
world, fortuna must manifest as changing events.  Virtù, on the other 
hand, is the quality possessed only by those who can utilise and, when 
required, partially create fortuna in order to establish themselves.  
‘You create your own luck’ gives a partial description of this ability. 
                                            
10
 See the discussion below on Machiavelli’s analysis of the forces destabilising Italian 
government.  
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 Virtù is not ‘virtue’, nor is it an ‘intrinsic essence’ of the Prince-
individual: it is, instead, “merely the reflection [in the individual], as 
conscious and responsible as possible, of the objective conditions for 
the accomplishment of the historical task…” (MU: 93-4).   
Althusser’s identification with Machiavelli's construction of an 
individual who could potentially harness—possibly even produce—an 
aleatory event might appear at first sight to be a slippage into a form 
of humanism.  This would also be heavily at odds with Balibar’s 
argument regarding of the change from FMP to the CMP (with its 
focus upon social structure).  However, it is not so much the agent of 
change in Machiavelli’s account that is holding Althusser’s interest; 
rather it is the creation of the moment of change—hence his focus on 
understanding what can produce a conjuncture (be that cause a 
human subject or a structural contradiction).  For Machiavelli, a 
Prince is successful precisely because s/he can escape the cyclical 
forces of history by steering present conjunctures into the void of 
possibility.  In Balibar’s (RC) and Althusser’s (1965/2005) work it is 
these periods of flux (Bhaskar 1982) in social relations that open up 
(or close down) the possibility of change.   
To reconcile these two partially conflicting accounts (i.e. of 
Balibar in RC and Althusser in MU), Althusser focuses his aleatory 
materialist account more heavily upon the ‘void’ (for a very good 
account of the ‘void’ in Althusser’s work, see Matheron 1998).  
Serving as the initial ‘formlessness’ from which form eventually 
began—the event of the clinamen, ‘the swerve’ of falling atoms 
(UCME : 169)—the void can be understood as a space containing both 
existing forms and potential forms.  Existing forms (i.e. structures) 
partially act as ‘hooks’ (ibid.: 191), capturing some of the possible 
forms of structure and turning then into copies (like ice capturing 
water).  But the void also exists as the space of possibility: either 
through chance or through struggle, other forms of structure are 
possible.  It is precisely this element in Machiavelli’s analysis of the 
Prince-individual that interested Althusser so much.  From this, 
Althusser is able to expand his focus back to the more general 
encounter between politics and history, which form as struggle 
(UCME : 189).  It is as a result of this ‘struggle’, this conflict between 
forces held in contradiction, that creates conjunctures.11 
 
                                            
11
 Contradiction is discussed in more detail below.  
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 Conjunctures and Machiavelli's ‘dispositive’  
Arguably of almost equal importance for Althusser was Machiavelli’s 
use of the concept of ‘dispositive’.  This was the means that enabled 
Machiavelli to “to think in the conjuncture” (MU: 18).  This began 
with the development of Machiavelli’s concept of what Althusser 
terms a ‘dispositif théorique’.  Highly problematic to translate into 
English (Elliott, 1999: xviii) “dispositif” is usually translated as 
‘apparatus’ or ‘social apparatus’; however, intriguingly, Elliott decided 
(partly on the advice of David Macey, translator of many of Foucault’s 
works, which regularly contain the term) to translate it as 
“dispositive”.  The reason for this becomes clearer when Elliott 
outlines the use Althusser has for his dispositif:  
 
The peculiarity of this term dispositif… is to state a series of 
general theses… which are literally contradictory, yet organised 
in such a way as to generate concepts not deducible from them, 
for the purpose of theorising an “‘object’ which is in fact a 
determinate objective” (MU: 42, emphasis in original).  [This is] 
Machiavelli's “endeavour to think the conditions of possibility of 
an impossible task, to think the unthinkable,” (MU: 50) (Elliott, 
1999: xviii).  
 
The idea of a dispositif that Althusser elaborates, therefore, develops 
Machiavelli's analysis of the criteria under which an impossible event 
could occur.  For Machiavelli, this was stable government in Italy and 
the ‘dispositive’ is precisely the series of contradictory statements that 
together outline this (im)possible event.  This series of statements 
should, under normal circumstances, prove either nonsensical or 
produce null results (i.e. the product of incompatible factors).  
Instead, Althusser argues, Machiavelli's great development is to 
outline a series of statements that, under a specific internal 
relationship to each other, produce a viable outcome: a ‘theoretical 
object’.  Translated as ‘dispositive’, therefore, it becomes clear that it 
implies a dis-positive: instead of a series of increasingly supportive 
statements (i.e. each one building upon the other, as would be 
expected to usually occur in a theoretical argument), Machiavelli 
instead brings in a number of contradictory statements but yet 
structures them together in such as a way as to make a viable result.   
By bringing three contradictory theses into a particular relation 
with each other, Machiavelli is able to theorise a possibility that did 
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 not previously exist: the means to achieve stable government in Italy.  
The three contradictory theses are: (1) the course of natural and 
human things is immutable; (2) everything is in continual unstable 
motion and subject to an unpredictable necessity; and (3) that history 
is cyclical (MU: 34-6).  The first thesis allows Machiavelli to compare 
different examples of government across different principalities.  
However, immutability would imply that things never change, when 
obviously they do.  Althusser argues that Machiavelli's second thesis, 
that everything in the world is subject to radical change, is a clear 
negation—and an outright contradiction—of the first thesis.  
However, it allows Machiavelli to adopt the position that there are 
moments of stability in a changing world and that these periods of 
stability are comparable.  The third thesis, of a cyclical history, is 
Machiavelli's means of negating the ‘randomness’ implicit in his 
second thesis: now we find that throughout the periods of radical 
change that alter the periods of stability, they follow a set of related 
forms.12  This allows Machiavelli to develop the position that without 
intervention it is the fate of Italy to suffer the continual imposition of 
either ineffectual (i.e. short-lived) government or simply ‘evil’ forms 
of government (ibid.).  (For a broader examination of the historical 
philosophy behind Althusser’s assessment of Machiavelli, see Del 
Lucchese 2012: 5-7).)   
The importance of this argument is that it brings together three 
statements that are not just in opposition with each other but are 
outright contradictions of each other.  However, as Althusser argues, 
the particular form—i.e. the relation—in which Machiavelli brings 
them together enables the development of a fourth ‘thesis’ additional 
to and outside of these relations.  This fourth thesis is, according to 
Althusser, Machiavelli's final ‘position’: viz. that (theoretically) there 
exists a void (MU: 41-2; Matheron 1998; Datta 2011; Kolšek 2013).  
As discussed above, the void is not understood as a ‘negativity’, rather 
it represents both the neutrality and the unlimited bounds of 
possibility.  It is this fourth thesis adopted by Machiavelli, Althusser 
argues, that allows him to displace the cyclical nature of 
government—“a very peculiar negation, since it does not merely deny 
[the third thesis], but completely displaces it” (ibid.: 41, emphasis in 
                                            
12
 To be precise Machiavelli argues that government cycles through: (i-a) Monarchy, (i-b) Tyranny, 
(ii-a) Aristocracy, (ii-b) Oligarchy, (iii-a) Democracy, (iii-b) Anarchy, then back to (i-a) Monarchy 
for the cycle to begin again (MU: 36-7).  
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 original).  It is an example in theoretical writing of cutting the 
Gordian Knot.  
The dispositive enabled Machiavelli to set three otherwise 
contradictory statements into a productive relationship with each 
other.  The result is the formation of a fourth thesis—the presence of 
the void and its possible futures—that enables the negation of the 
dispositive itself.  The breakthrough that Althusser wishes to utilise is 
the idea of the arrangement:  
 
We thereby perceive Machiavelli's relation to his general theses, 
to what can be called his theory of history.  By working on these 
theses, he so arranges them that, far from applying them as the 
general truth of every possible object to a particular concrete 
object, he determines them in negating them by one another.  
And he does so in order to make them produce, on their own 
theoretical basis, which plays the conjoint role of philosophical 
principle and conceptual matrix, concepts that it is strictly 
impossible to deduce from these theses. 
Indeed, taken literally, these theses are contradictory, and 
the only effect they can have is to preclude any discourse.  But if 
they are considered in their arrangement, their dispositive and 
their interplay, their inconsistency becomes productive of a new 
theoretical space and precise conceptual effects (MU: 44, 
emphasis in original).   
 
To reiterate, Machiavelli’s displacement of existing social relations 
through the theoretical dispositive creates a particular form of 
problematic.  The possibilities that the dispositive opens up (i.e. ‘the 
void’) is the means by which Machiavelli is able to ‘exit’ the 
problematic that he has created.  Althusser is here bringing to the 
forefront the aleatory elements of Machiavelli's theory.  Machiavelli 
represents, for Althusser, one of the finest examples of theorising 
within the conjuncture.  It was precisely because Machiavelli did not 
succumb to ideological thought—e.g. ‘the aristocracy are our betters, 
all that is required is for them to be more pious and then their 
inherently superior qualities will manifest and their good governance 
over us will ensue’—but instead focused on the concrete relations that 
existed in the political and theoretical conjuncture of which he was 
part (Althusser 1967/1990: 103).  
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 Theory from the Conjuncture: Developing Aleatory 
Materialism in and Beyond Althusser 
So far it has been identified that aleatory materialism understands 
change as a process identifiable in both structures and conjunctures.  
Furthermore, it rejects explanations that rely upon transcendental 
forces (e.g. gods, Reason, or subjectivity).  Instead, change is 
understood as the outcome of alterations between social relations 
that, for the most part, exist in tension with one another.  The 
rejection of teleological or agent-centred explanations places the 
focus of aleatory materialist theoretical inquiry firmly upon social 
(and natural) structures and how these manifest as social relations.  
By creating an ontological account of social relations that 
understands them as (1) complex, (2) mutually influential, and (3) as 
partly formed by the structures that place the elements in some form 
of relation to one another, social change per se can now be 
understood as the alteration to the relations between elements.   
The theory of aleatory materialist change, however, has so far 
only been briefly discussed when elaborating Althusser’s argument in 
UCME.  However, by breaking down Althusser’s aleatory materialist 
argument it becomes possible to identify which elements of his theory 
he draws upon in developing the foundations for aleatory 
materialism.13  The first of these theoretical elements is Althusser’s 
expansion of Marx’s exclusion of Hegel.  This allowed Althusser to 
retain the concept of a ‘decentred totality’ and of history as a 
‘process’—including understanding social relations as operating in 
terms of contradictions and with the effects of overdetermination.  
The second aspect was to conceive of the forces present in a 
conjuncture both as an inventory and as an interacting system.  Third 
and finally, there is the aleatory form of the changes that occur to 
social relations—a relation that enables key elements in Althusser’s 
argument to be brought together into a relational whole.  
 
Historical events within decentred totalities  
Althusser’s argument for the development of history as a process and 
society as a totality of interlinked relations is too complex to go into 
even partially here.  The details of these arguments made by 
Althusser and others can be found in (Althusser CO; RC; 1970/2007; 
                                            
13
 n.b. This is not to make the revisionist claim that Althusser ‘always was’ an aleatory materialist, 
nor that his work necessarily ‘led’ to aleatory materialism.  The claim being made is only that 
identifiable elements of his earlier work can be seen in the later aleatory materialism.   
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 Balibar 1996; Benton 1984; Callari & Ruccio 1996; Elliott 1994; Resch 
1992).   
However, a brief summarisation of Althusser's argument is 
useful because it gives context to the operation of aleatory 
materialism.  Althusser expands Marx’s original (but only partial) 
expulsion of Hegel’s idealism (CO).  While retaining Hegel’s 
argument that it is through changes to social relations over time that 
society changes, Althusser ejects the Hegelian dialectic and all of the 
‘teleological mysticism’ that it entails (CO: 101-103).  Instead of a 
transcendental force being the engine that drives history, all change is 
now generated by and occurs within an already-existing space/place, 
altering and (re)forming this space/place into something different 
(Althusser 1970/2007: 181).  Because there is no overarching telos, 
etc. to society its structures are together understood to be a 
‘decentred totality’—i.e. there is no thing/object/force that drives the 
totality in any one direction.  Of course, this is not to say that there 
are no structures of great force or influence (for where, otherwise, 
would that leave the concept of ‘mode of production’?).  There can be 
dominant relations—like that of capital and labour—but those 
relations neither establish and maintain themselves through some 
inherent supra-historical force already contained within them, nor 
suddenly become supra-historical.  For the aleatory materialist, all 
structural relations have both a history and a need for continuous 
reproduction.   
When changes to structural relations do occur, Althusser terms 
them historical events (CO: 126).  Of all of the events that continually 
occur in society, these become significant because they either alter or 
later become inserted into existing social relations, it is because of 
these changes that they become understood as ‘historical’.   
 
What makes such and such an event historical is not the fact that 
it is an event, but precisely its insertion into forms which are 
themselves historical, into… forms which… are perfectly 
definable and knowable….  An event falling within one of these 
[historical] forms, which has the wherewithal to fall within one of 
these forms, which is a possible content for one of these forms, 
which affects them, concerns them, reinforces or disturbs them, 
which provokes them or which they provoke, or even choose or 
select, that is a historical event (CO: 126, emphasis in original).  
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 Importantly, it is a posteriori knowledge that allows an event to be 
recognised as historical or not.  For Althusser, an event is ‘historical’ 
only because it affects the social structure in some way.  But this does 
not explain how an event becomes part of the wider social structure 
and a conjuncture in its own right.   
 
Conjunctural elements as both inventory and system  
Understanding a conjuncture as a particular relation of forces and 
not as an independent thing-in-itself, Althusser is undertaking two 
simultaneous analyses.  The first is that when inquiring into the form 
of the conjuncture it is necessary to develop an inventory of the 
particular forces in operation at the time.  For Machiavelli, in both 
The Prince and the Discourses on Livy, he outlines the extreme 
misery brought to Italy by the incessant wars between the numerous 
mini-republics, the various papal interventions, and the continuous 
recourse to and invasion by foreign monarchs (MU: 18).  This is the 
‘inventory’ aspect of Althusser’s analysis: what is it that constitutes 
the forces active in the conjuncture?  
However, merely listing elements present within a conjuncture is 
insufficient for creating an account of what that conjuncture actually 
does when operating.  For Althusser, the strength of Machiavelli's 
analysis is that he moves to create the different components into a 
working system.  “The conjuncture is thus no mere summary of its 
elements, or enumeration of diverse circumstances, but their 
contradictory system, which poses the political problem and 
indicates its historical solution, ipso facto rendering it a political 
objective, a practical task” (MU: 19, emphasis in original).  By 
working through the concrete relations and interactions in a 
particular conjuncture, the conjuncture becomes transformed into an 
abstract political problem—i.e. it becomes possible to theorise a 
means of destabilising the relations between the forces present within 
the crystallised conjuncture.   
This demonstrates the importance of the dispositive for 
Althusser.  The dispositive acts as a means of structuring what would 
appear to be contradictory or (otherwise) nonsensical 
theses/propositions into a working system.  If this can be achieved, 
then a resolution to the conjuncture may become apparent (be it the 
void, or something else).  This remains one of Althusser’s most 
underdeveloped aspects of aleatory materialism: how to determine 
not only the elements present in a conjuncture, but also their system 
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 of interrelation.  While there is not space here in the article to go 
much further into this next point, an intriguing similarity exists 
between Althusser’s arguments for the need to examine the inventory 
and system contained in a dispositive (MU: 18), his later argument 
for retroaction (UCME: 193-194), and the critical realist concepts of 
retroduction and retrodiction (Bhaskar 1978/2008, 1979/2005, 
1986; Elder-Vass 2007; Hardy 2011; Lawson 1997/1998; Pearce 
2007).  Crudely put, retroduction establishes what elements are 
present in a ‘closed’ system (meaning outside interferences are 
excluded); while retrodiction examines how elements, especially in an 
‘open’ system (where outside forces are unable to be excluded), affect 
each other at different times.  The prima facie similarity between 
‘inventory’ and ‘system’ should be apparent.  The result is a part 
empirical, part theoretical account that provides a detailed analysis of 
an event in terms of both elements and interaction.  It might also be 
worth noting (Elliott 1987: fn.6 330-331) that Roy Bhaskar, the 
founder and one of the key early critical realists, stated that 
“Althusser was ‘the foremost Marxist influence’ on a Realist Theory 
of Science” (the first critical realist text).   
 
The aleatory formation of conjunctures  
The final component of Althusser’s analysis incorporates the 
introduction of the aleatory moment into the conjuncture.  This 
works along the following lines: first, there is the initial aleatory 
encounter, which brings different elements together; second, the 
different forces, powers, and attributes of the elements provide the 
initial background ‘mechanics’ as to how the conjuncture arises;14 
third, the conjuncture may (or may not) create effects, that impact 
upon other structures or conjunctures; finally, the conjuncture or its 
effects may (or may not) crystallise into an enduring form.  The 
outcome of this argument means the following four propositions can 
be made.   
(a) That the material world is (ontologically) immanently sui 
generis, i.e. the world exists ‘as is’, with no outside structure or form 
determining it;  
                                            
14
 This is not to imply that things always-already contain their attributes.  Things can have powers, 
like the human power of labour, but the form and utilisation of that power differs depending on the 
social circumstances they are in—e.g. is labour expended in an agrarian, artisan, or industrial 
form?  This point relates to Footnote 8 above.  
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 (b) That structures exist in the present and so must continually 
require renewal and reconstruction, meaning they are open to 
change;  
(c) That the task of the philosopher—following Marx’s lead in the 
Eleventh Thesis (Marx 1845/1983)—is to abstractly break a structure 
into its component parts and establish how they maintain their 
relations; and  
(d) The philosopher must try to understand the struggle(s) 
inherent in politics (in the Althusserian sense), for politics increases 
the likelihood of altering crystallised conjunctures.   
These four points can be linked together because Althusser 
relates properties, tendencies, powers, and capabilities found within a 
conjuncture to its particular configuration of elements.  The 
conjuncture overdetermines many, if not all, of its elements—at least 
it overdetermines the social elements (e.g. even the CMP has to 
observe gravity when enacted upon the Earth’s surface).  This enables 
the aleatory materialist philosopher to produce accounts of how, and 
why, particular structures produce different effects at different 
times—even when they might be expected to ‘operate’ differently.  
It is worth letting Althusser have the closing words on this 
matter. 
 
…[T]here exists a word in German, Geschichte, which designates 
not an accomplished history, but history in the present [au 
présent], doubtless determined in large part, yet only in part, by 
the already accomplished past; for a history which is present, 
which is living, is also open to a future that is uncertain, 
unforeseeable, not yet accomplished, and therefore aleatory.  
Living history obeys only a constant (not a law): the constant of 
class struggle.  Marx did not use the term ‘constant’,… but an 
expression of genius: ‘tendential law’, capable of inflecting (but 
not contradicting) the primary tendential law, which means that 
a tendency does not possess the form or figure of a linear law, but 
can bifurcate under the impact of an encounter with another 
tendency, and so on ad infinitum.  At each intersection the 
tendency can take a path that is unforeseeable because it is 
aleatory (Althusser 1987/2006: 264).  
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 Conclusion  
The arguments presented in this article have attempted outline both 
the theory behind and the process of aleatory materialist accounts of 
social change.  Aleatory materialism was argued to be a significant 
development in regard to materialist accounts because it enabled a 
non-deterministic and non-reductionist articulation of change.  Able 
to encompass and explain change in both social structure and in 
various forms of conjuncture (e.g. theoretical, social, etc.), aleatory 
materialism emphasises the contingency and necessity associated 
with change without reducing it to pure random chance.   
However, aleatory materialist accounts were argued to require 
theoretical development because of their conceptual 
underdevelopment.  A result of aleatory materialism's incompletion 
at the time of his death, theoretical integration was required to link 
aleatory materialism into existing Althusserian accounts.  Examples 
of this were achieved through analysis of the (failed Italian and 
successful British) formations of a capitalist mode of production.  By 
examining these accounts, substance was given to what might, 
otherwise, be only a skeletal account of aleatory materialism.   
Also identified in Althusser’s work were important arguments 
regarding Machiavelli.  Machiavelli’s conceptual elaboration of what, 
as Althusser would later term them, a ‘conjuncture’ and a ‘dispositive’ 
were argued to be key in forming aleatory materialism.  The concept 
of conjuncture is crucial not only because it enabled vertical 
comparisons to be made between social structures (e.g. from modes 
of production to forms of government to individual events), the 
concept of conjuncture also enabled horizontal comparisons between 
different types of conjuncture (e.g. from social structures to the 
structured relations of politics, ideology, and theory).  The concept of 
dispositive was used by Althusser to relate a number of contradictory 
theses into a relational structure.  This structuring enabled 
theoretical resolutions to protracted conjunctures (as argued by 
Machiavelli and Althusser for the formation of a void).  
By bringing conjuncture and dispositive together, the result was 
to enable conjunctures to be theorised both as a number of different 
social elements (an inventory) but also as being interrelated (a 
structured system).  This analysis can account for (semi-)stable social 
relations, yet also enable the social theorist/philosopher to query how 
the maintenance of the conjuncture occurs and—by extension—where 
possible sites of political struggle might exist.   
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 It is worth concluding on a cautionary note.  It is sometimes easy 
to forget—and Althusser appears at times to fall victim to this—that 
what is being discussed is all in the abstract.  While Machiavelli 
achieved an intellectual feat worthy of respect and consideration, he 
was not able to effect change: he was able only to theorise a process 
through which change might occur.  The difficulty of this was 
summarised is his argument for why there needs to be a Prince for 
whom the possession of virtù and the wielding of fortuna is a real 
possibility.  It should always he held in mind, therefore, that theory 
from within the conjuncture is only the first half of the conundrum, 
the second is in undertaking the struggle that is the theory’s result.  
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